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The effects of consumption and production externalities on economic performance under time non-
separable preferences are examined both theoretically and numerically.  We show that a consumption 
externality alone has long-run distortionary effects if and only if labor is supplied elastically.  With 
fixed labor supply, it has only transitional distortionary effects.  Production externalities always 
generate long-run distortions, irrespective of labor supply.  The optimal tax structure to correct for the 
distortions is characterized.  We compare the implications of this model with those obtained when the 
consumption externality is contemporaneous.  While some of the long-run effects are robust, there are 
also important qualitative and quantitative differences, particularly along transitional paths. 
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   1. Introduction 
  Externalities have engaged the attention of economists over a long period of time.  Broadly 
speaking, they can be categorized as (i) consumption externalities, and (ii) production externalities.  
Recently, the former have been extensively studied in the context of models of “keeping up with the 
Joneses,” and their implications for a range of important issues investigated.  These include: asset 
pricing [Abel, 1990, Constantinides, 1990, Gali, 1994, Campbell and Cochrane, 1999], short-run 
macroeconomic stabilization policy [Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000], consumption [Dupor and Liu, 
2003], capital accumulation and growth [Fisher and Hof, 2000, Liu and Turnovsky, 2005]. On the 
other hand, production externalities have been a key element in the recent endogenous growth 
literature.  Empirical evidence on the importance of externalities is sparse, but several studies 
provide convincing support for the significance of consumption externalities [Easterlin 1995, Clark 
and Oswald 1996, and Frank 1997].  Evidence on production externalities, though less conclusive, is 
still quite compelling [Caballero and Lyons 1990, 1992, and Benarroch 1997]. 
  A related and equally important issue concerns the specification of preferences themselves.  
The conventional intertemporal utility function is time-separable, with any consumption externality 
being introduced as contemporaneous economy-wide consumption, as in the references cited above.  
But a growing body of empirical evidence has confirmed the importance of time non-separable 
preferences, in which utility depends not only upon current consumption, but also on a benchmark or 
“habit” level of consumption determined from past behavior.  In the case that this benchmark is 
defined in terms of the consumption of an external reference group it introduces a consumption 
externality (utility interdependence), but one that is tied to past consumptions.  This formulation is 
often termed “catching up with”, rather than “keeping up with”, with the Joneses.
1  Empirical 
evidence supporting time non-separable utility specifications are provided by van de Stadt, Kapteyn, 
and van de Geer (1985), Osborn (1988) and more recently Fuhrer (2000).  
  In light of these bodies of evidence, the effect of consumption and production externalities on 
economic performance becomes important.  To what extent do they introduce distortions into the 
                                                 
1In the present case, where the benchmark involves the consumption of an outside reference group, agents are sometimes 
referred to as being “outward looking”.  In contrast, the benchmark may depend upon the agent’s own past consumption.  
In that case agents are said to be “inward looking” and there is no consumption externality; see e.g. Carroll, et al (1997).     2
process of capital accumulation, and if so, what are the appropriate corrective policy responses?  Liu 
and Turnovsky (2005) have addressed this question employing a standard time separable utility 
function.  But given the evidence supporting the time non-separability of utility, it is important to re-
examine the issue for this more general, and arguably more realistic, specification of preferences.   
To do so is the objective of the present paper.  More specifically, we introduce time non-
separable preferences, as originally specified by Abel (1990) in the context of asset pricing, into the 
“non-scale growth model” developed by Eicher and Turnovsky (1999).  Previous applications of 
these preferences by Carroll, et al (1997) and others have typically imposed rigid production 
conditions of the simplest endogenous growth model.
2  But the interaction between preferences and 
production flexibility is important.  This is shown by Alvarez-Cuadrado, et al (2004) who highlight 
the importance of combining more general preferences with the more flexible technology of the non-
scale growth model to replicate certain observed behavior.   
The paper proceeds in two main stages.  The first part (Sections 2-6) develops the general 
theoretical model.  The latter (Sections 7 and 8) supplements this with numerical simulations of both 
the steady-state equilibrium and the transitional dynamics in response to an increase in productivity.  
One general conclusion is that consumption externalities in isolation will have long-run distortionary 
effects on the economy if and only if labor supply is elastic.  This is because such externalities affect 
the marginal valuation of consumption, which, if the leisure decision is endogenous, changes the 
optimal utility value of the marginal product of labor, thereby influencing long-run capital and 
output.  Thus, with elastic labor supply, a negative consumption externality leads to long-run 
consumption, capital, labor supply, and output equilibria, all of which exceed their respective 
optima.  But even if labor supply is fixed and consumption externalities alone have no long-run 
distortionary effects, they still distort the transitional dynamic path.   
Production externalities alone always generate long-run distortions, irrespective of whether 
or not labor supply is fixed.  Thus a positive production externality leads to a sub-optimally low 
capital stock, together with under-employment, under-production and under-consumption.  In 
                                                 
2There are exceptions, however.  One is the pioneering work by Ryder and Heal (1973) who introduced habit formation 
into the basic neoclassical growth model; a more recent example is Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005).   3
addition, a consumption externality will affect the potency of the production externality on long-run 
activity through its impact on the labor-leisure choice and thus on the marginal product of capital. 
We characterize an optimal tax policy to correct for the distortionary effects.  It requires 
capital income to be taxed or subsidized at a constant rate that corrects for the production externality, 
while consumption should be taxed or subsidized at a time-varying rate that corrects for the 
divergence between the social and private benefits from the consumption externality as reflected in 
the evolving relative shadow value of habits to capital.  The tax on labor income can be set at an 
arbitrary constant rate, allowing the policy maker to accommodate some other objective.   
The simulations confirm and supplement these theoretical findings in several dimensions.  
First, the numerical impacts of the two externalities on steady-state equilibrium are assessed, and we 
find that both externalities of plausible magnitudes generate substantial long-run distortionary 
effects.  For the consumption externality they are proportionate across key measures of economic 
activity, whereas for the production externality they are highly disproportionate. 
Second, as a vehicle for examining the distortions along the transitional adjustment path, we 
introduce a 50% increase in productivity.  Because of the non-scale technology, this shock affects 
the long-run measures of economic activity in both the decentralized and centrally planned 
economies by identical proportionate amounts.  The differences in proportionate  welfare gains 
between the two economies reflect differences along the transitional paths and are therefore small.  
But the actual magnitudes of the welfare differences can be substantial.  We also trace out the ratios 
of key variables in the decentralized economy to their respective optima in order to determine how 
the sizes of the various distortions evolve over time.  In our base simulations these ratios show 
relatively little intertemporal variation.  But this finding is sensitive to a number of factors including: 
the relative weight of the benchmark consumption level in utility, the weight of past consumption in 
the construction of benchmark consumption, and, in some cases, the flexibility of labor supply.
3   
The paper is related to two recent studies, although it differs substantially from both in key 
ways.  In addressing optimal fiscal policy it is related to Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005).  But while 
                                                 
3 It is also dependent upon the underlying shock itself.  In an expanded version of this paper we illustrate this by 
considering the time path of the distortion in capital following a 50% decrease in the rate of time preference.   4
they assume labor supply is inelastic, our analysis endogenizes labor supply.  This is crucial for the 
consumption externality to generate permanent distortions, and therefore important for optimal tax 
policy.  Second, (assuming discrete time) they specify the reference consumption level to be the 
previous period’s economy-wide average consumption level.  We allow for a much more gradual 
adjustment, which not only is important in reconciling the implications of this model with certain 
observed empirical phenomena [Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2004] but is also important for optimal 
policy.  We parameterize the weight given to past consumption in the construction of the reference 
consumption level, with the contemporaneous externality emerging as a limiting case. 
The paper can also be viewed as generalizing Liu and Turnovsky (2005) to more general 
preferences and extending it in several key dimensions.  First, and most importantly, it presents a 
much more complete characterization of distortions along the dynamic adjustment path, a task for 
which numerical simulations become inevitable.  Second, the numerical calibrations provide a sense 
of the plausible magnitudes of the distortionary effects, both in the long run and over time.  Third, 
they enable us to assess the extent to which the specification of the reference stock is important.  To 
accomplish this, throughout our analysis we compare the current approach, where the reference 
stock is based on past habit, to the case where the consumption externality is contemporaneous.  As 
conjectured in the previous paper, the steady-state implications of that model are generally 
qualitatively similar to those summarized here in Propositions 1 and 2, suggesting some robustness 
of the previous results, although some modifications also arise.  Moreover, the simulations highlight 
quantitative differences between the two formulations, which in some cases may be quite dramatic. 
2.  Preferences and Technology: Consumption and Production Externalities 
  Consider an economy populated by N infinitely-lived identical households, where N grows at 
the constant exponential rate, n.  The agent is endowed with a unit of time, part of which,  i L , can be 
supplied as labor input and the remainder,  1 ii lL ≡ − , consumed as leisure.  At any instant of time 
households derive utility not only from their current consumption,  i C , and leisure, but also from the 
current level of a reference consumption stock, H , (habit) based on economy-wide consumption 
that the agent takes as given.  Thus the agent’s utility is represented by an iso-elastic function of the   5
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From the right hand side of (1), we see that agents derive utility from a geometric weighted 
average of absolute and relative consumption, these corresponding to  0 γ = , and  1 γ = , respectively.  
The agent’s reference stock or consumption habit is specified by 
  
()() ()
t t Ht e C d
ρτ ρ ττ
−
−∞ = ∫      ρ > 0    (2) 
Thus (2) implies that the agent’s reference stock is an exponentially declining weighted average of 
the economy-wide average consumption 
1 ()
N
i i CC N τ
= ≡∑ .  Differentiating (2) with respect to time 
yields the following rate of adjustment for the reference stock 
() () () () Ht Ct Ht ρ =−         ( 3 )  
The parameter, ρ, reflects the relative importance of recent consumption in determining the current 
reference (benchmark) stock.  As ρ →∞,  () () Ht Ct → , the contemporaneous economy-wide 
average consumption, adopted by Gali (1994) and others, which obtains as a limiting case.  With H  
determined by (2) [or (3)] the economy-wide consumption imposes an externality on the agent.
4   
Analogous to Liu and Turnovsky we shall impose the following restrictions on the size of the 
consumption externality, to ensure that its impact is dominated by the direct consumption benefits: 
    1 γ <          ( 4 a )  
    ( 1 ) 0 ε γγ −+ >       ( 4 b )  
Inequality (4a) is the non-satiation condition initially imposed by Ryder and Heal (1973), which 
asserts that a uniformly sustained increase in consumption level increases utility.  The second 
                                                 
4 Most of the literature assumes  0 γ ≥ , implying that agents derive disutility from a ceteris paribus increase in the 
consumption reference stock.  This expresses the idea of “catching up to the Joneses”, as formulated by Carroll et al 
(1997), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and Alvarez-Cuadrado et al (2004).  But we shall also permit  0 γ < , thus 
characterizing an altruistic agent; see Dupor and Liu (2003).   6
condition restricts the externality so as to ensure that a uniformly sustained increase in consumption 
level across agents has diminishing marginal utility.
5 
  The household has a production technology that is homogeneous of degree one in its private 
inputs, capital  i K  and labor  i L , with both factors having positive but diminishing marginal physical 
product.  In addition, output depends on the aggregate stock of capital, denoted by  i i KK =∑ .  
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, individual output is determined by 
    
1 ;         0 1 ii i YL K K
σσ η ασ
− =< <      (5) 
The externality generated by aggregate capital, η , may be positive, zero, or negative.  In 
Romer (1986) the aggregate capital stock serves as a proxy for the level of knowledge and thus 
generates a positive production externality.  However,  0 η <  may reflect adverse congestion effects 
of aggregate capital on the productivity of private capital; see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
The following restrictions, analogous to (4), are imposed on the production externality: 
    ( 1 ) σ ησ >> −−        ( 6 )  
The right hand inequality ensures that the externality, if negative, is sufficiently small so that the 
social marginal product of capital remains positive [see (18c) below].  The left hand inequality 
imposes an upper limit on any positive externality generated by aggregate capital, in order for a 
uniformly sustained increase in capital stock to have diminishing marginal product.
 6  
3.  Macrodynamic Equilibrium: Decentralized Economy 
  The individual in the decentralized economy chooses consumption, labor supply, and rate of 
capital accumulation to maximize the utility function (1) subject to the capital accumulation equation 
    ( ) ii i i Kr n K w L C δ =− − + −         ( 7 )  
                                                 
5 Expressed in terms of general utility functions these two conditions require:  (,, ) (,, )0 ; C i ii H i ii U CCl U CCl +>  
 (,, ) (,, )0 CC i i i CH i i i U CCl U CCl +< .  In fact, for  1 ε >  and the constant elasticity utility function, (4a) implies (4b), 
although this is not true in general. 
6Turnovsky (2000) derives σ η >  as a necessary and sufficient for stability in the basic one-sector non-scale growth 
model with conventional utility.  It also turns out to be a necessary condition for stability for the present model.   7
where r denotes the gross return to capital, w denotes the wage rate, and δ  denotes the constant rate 
of depreciation of capital.  In doing so, the agent takes the aggregate quantities C  and K, as well as 
the evolution of the reference consumption stock, (3), as given. 
The first order conditions for an optimum are
7 
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        ( 8 c )  
where  i λ  denotes the private shadow value to agent i of an additional unit of capital, together with 
the transversality condition lim
t→∞λiKie
−βt = 0.  The interpretations of these equations are standard; (8a) 
equates the marginal utility of consumption to the private  shadow value of capital taking into 
account that utility depends upon current consumption relative to the benchmark; (8b) equates the 
marginal utility of leisure to the private opportunity cost, the real wage valued at the shadow value of 
capital, while (8c) equates the marginal return to capital to the rate of return on consumption.   
Aggregating (5) over the N identical agents, yields the aggregate production function 
()
1 (1 ) Yl N K
σ σ η α
− + =−        ( 9 )  
where  i i YY ≡∑ .  Total returns to scale, 1+η, are decreasing, constant, or increasing, according to 
whether the spillover from aggregate capital is negative, zero, or positive.  The equilibrium gross 
real return to capital, r, and the real wage, w, are respectively: 
  (1 ) (1 ) ;  
i i
ii i i
ii i i i KK KK
YY Y Y YY
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∂∂
    (10) 
Substituting (10) into (7), the individual’s rate of capital accumulation can be expressed as  
1 () ii i i i KL K K C nK
σσ η αδ
− =− − +        (7’) 
                                                 
7 Since all agents are identical and therefore allocate their time identically, we can drop the agent’s subscript to l when 
setting out the equilibrium.   8
We define a balanced growth path as being one along which all quantities grow at a constant 
rate, except for the labor allocation, which is constant.  With capital being accumulated from final 
output, along such a path the capital-output ratio, KY, remains constant.  From the aggregate 
production function the long-run equilibrium balanced growth rate of output and capital,  ˆ Y  and ˆ K , is  





                  (11) 
Because of the non-scale nature of the production function, the equilibrium growth rate is 
determined solely by technological factors, summarized by the term  () g σ ση ≡ − , together with 
the population growth rate, and is independent of all demand characteristics, including the 
consumption externality; see Jones (1995).  There is long-run per capita growth if and only if  0 η > . 
Following our definition of the balanced growth path, it is convenient to write the system in 
terms of the following stationary variables  ,, ,
g gg g kK NyY NhH NcC N ≡≡ ≡≡ , (where C 
also denotes the aggregate) which we term as being “scale-adjusted” per capita quantities, and which 
under constant returns to scale ( 1) g =  reduce to standard per capita quantities. Using this notation, 
the scale adjusted aggregate output (9) can be written as: 
()
1 1 yl k
σ σ η α
− + =−         ( 1 2 )  
We will focus on equilibrium paths along which all households are identical, so that 
,  ii CC C KK == =.  We shall refer to such paths as “symmetric equilibria”.   
It is straightforward (but tedious) to express the equilibrium dynamics of the decentralized 
economy in terms of the redefined stationary variables,  , , , lkhc ,












         ( 1 3 a )  
() ()
** * * 1 hc h g n h ρ =− + −          (13b) 
                                                 
8 Details are available from the authors.  Solving (13d) and (12) yields 
** * ** * * * (,) ,  (,) cc k lyy k l == .  Then substituting 
these solutions into (13a) – (13c) yields an autonomous dynamic system in 
** * ,, khl  .  The numerical analysis conducted 
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     ( 1 3 e )  
together with the production function (12),
 where * denotes the decentralized economy: 
Equation (13d) is obtained by dividing the optimality conditions (8a) and (8b). It reflects the 
condition that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure() Cl θ , which 
grows with per capita consumption, must equal the wage rate( ) (1 ) Yl σ − , which grows with per 
capita income. Notice that the equilibrium consumption-output ratio increases with leisure, this 
result reflecting the complementarity between leisure and consumption in utility. 
  Imposing the steady state condition, 
*** 0 lkh = ==  , we can solve (13) for the steady-state 
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First, (14c) yields the steady-state output-capital ratio, so that the long-run net private return to 
capital equals the rate of return on consumption, the latter being β , adjusted by the long-run utility   10
benefits derived from the production externality.  Equation (14b) determines the equilibrium ratio of 
consumption to its reference stock. Having determined the output-capital ratio, (14a) determines the 
consumption-output ratio consistent with generating the growth rate of capital necessary to equip the 
growing labor force and replace the depreciating capital stock.  Given the steady-state consumption 
to output ratio, (14e) determines the allocation of time to leisure, 
* l , and given the steady-state 
values for 
** *  and  ly k   , the production function, (14d), then implies the corresponding value of 
capital, 
* k   and hence output, 
* y  . 
We shall focus on three parameters:  and  γ η , which specify the two externalities, and ρ , the 
(exponentially declining) weight given to past consumption in the construction of the reference 
stock.  From (14) we observe an important asymmetry between the two externalities.  The 
consumption externality influences steady-state equilibrium in the decentralized economy if and 
only if there is a production externality (i.e.  0 η ≠ ); see (14c).  In contrast, the production externality 
influences the equilibrium independent of any consumption externality.  This is through its effect on 
the equilibrium growth rate, reflected in the right hand side of (14a). 
If 0  (i.e.  1) g η == , the parameters  , γ ρ , characterizing the consumption externality both 
become irrelevant.  In that case (14b) implies 
** ch =   , so that the stationary current and reference 
consumption levels coincide.  Equation (14c) reduces to the standard modified golden rule condition, 
and the overall steady-state equilibrium reduces to that of conventional time-separable utility.  If 
0 η ≠ , the consumption externality, γ , affects the entire steady state, while ρ affects only the 
consumption-habits ratio.  Thus the steady-state values for 
**** ,,, kLyc     are identical, whether the 
reference stock is formed contemporaneously, or as a weighted average of past consumption. 
Suppose  0 η > , and assume  1 ε > .  Then, as γ  increases, so that the externality imposed by 
aggregate consumption becomes more negative, the long-run rate of return on consumption [the right 
hand side of (14c)], and thus the output-capital ratio, declines.  For goods market equilibrium to 
prevail, the consumption-output ratio must also decline, inducing less leisure, i.e. more labor supply.  
This enhances the productivity of capital, thus inducing a larger long-run level of capital stock, 
output, and consumption.  The responses are reversed if the production externality is negative.   
In Section 8 below, we shall illustrate the dynamic response of the economy by introducing   11
an increase in productivity, α .  From (14), we see that the long-run responses are 
    
***
** *








       ( 1 5 )  
The capital stock, output, and consumption change proportionately, implying that the output-capital 
ratio, consumption-output ratio, and hence leisure (labor) remain unchanged.
9   
4.  Macrodynamic Equilibrium: Centrally Planned Economy 
In deriving his optimum, the individual agent neglects the externalities present in both 
consumption and production.  As a consequence, the macroeconomic equilibrium generated by the 
decentralized economy may diverge from the social optimum.  To derive the optimal resource 
allocation of the economy, we consider a social planner who chooses quantities directly to maximize 
the intertemporal utility of the representative agent, (1), while taking both externalities into account. 
Specifically, the central planner internalizes the aggregation relationship  i KN K = , thus 
perceiving the individual’s resource constraint (7’) as 
 
1 () ii i i i KL KN C nK
σσ η η αδ
−+ =− − +        ( 7 ” )  
He further perceives that the consumption reference stock depends upon the economy-wide average 
consumption level, [which equals the consumption of the representative agent], and thus internalizes 
the impact of the agent’s current consumption decision on the future evolution of the reference stock, 
in accordance with (3).  Performing the maximization, the optimality conditions become 
1
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     ( 1 6 c )  
                                                 
9 That these responses are independent of the consumption externality, but dependent upon the production externality, is 
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where,  1i λ ,  2i λ , denote the social shadow values associated with the capital stock,  i K , and the 
reference consumption stock, H , respectively, together with the transversality conditions 
12 lim lim 0
tt
ii i tt eK eH
ββ λλ
−−
→∞ →∞ ==       ( 1 6 e )  
There are several key differences from the corresponding conditions for the decentralized 
economy.  First, (16a) equates the utility of an additional unit of consumption, adjusted by its impact 
on the future reference stock, to the social shadow value of capital.  Second, (16c) equates the social 
rate of return to capital to the social rate of return on consumption.  Third, (16d) is an intertemporal 
allocation condition equating at the margin, the rate of return on habits – which consists of its direct 
utility benefits less costs through its impact on future accumulation – to the rate of return on 
consumption, both evaluated in terms of the shadow value of habits. 
Thus the optimization problem confronting the central planner requires the monitoring of two 
state variables.  Letting  21 ii i q λ λ ≡  denote the relative price of consumption habit to physical 
capital, after summing across households we can express the macrodynamic equilibrium of the 
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o denotes the “optimum” or equilibrium in the centrally planned economy, F is defined as in (13e), 
and the production function is given by (12). 
Imposing the stationary conditions,  0
oooo lhqk = ===    , together with the production 
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The parallels between these six equations and (14a) – (14e) for the decentralized economy 
are clear, and indeed, equations (18a), (18b), and (18d) remain unchanged.  An important difference 
arises with regard to (18c), where the left hand side includes the effect of the production externality 
and thus measures the social rate of return to capital, while the right hand side coincides with that of 
(14c) and equals the private rate of return on consumption.  In other words, the steady-state social 
and private rates of return on consumption coincide.   
The consumption externality operates through two channels.  In addition to its impact via the 
                                                 
10 The derivations actually involve some details that are spelled out in an Appendix available from the authors.   14
return to consumption [the right hand side of (18c)] it is also reflected in the social marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and leisure, (18e).  In contrast to the representative agent who 
evaluates the consumption-leisure choice in terms of the private marginal rate of substitution, (14e), 
the central planner also takes into account the social marginal value of the reference consumption 
stock through the term 1( 1 )
o q ρ −  .  Equation (18f) implies that unless there is an implausibly large 
negative production externality,  0
o q <   if and only if the consumption externality is negative 
(0 γ > ).
11  In that case, an increase in the level of the reference stock, given current consumption, is 
welfare-reducing, so that its shadow value is negative.  The opposite argument applies when  0 γ < .   
As a consequence of this second effect, a critical difference between (18) and (14) is that in 
the centrally planned economy the consumption externality γ  has effects even in the absence of a 
production externality.  Setting  0 η = ,  ,
oo oo ykcy     are independent of γ  and indeed are identical 
in the two economies.  But when  0 η = ,  ( ) 1( 1 ) 1 ( )
o q ρ γρ β ρ −= − +  , implying that an increase in 
γ  reduces the relative valuation, 1( 1 )
o q ρ −  .  Given 
oo cy  , this raises leisure (reduces labor 
supply), and given 
oo yk   , the reduction in labor supply reduces capital, output, and consumption.   
It is further evident that an increase in ρ  will increase 1( 1 )
o q ρ −   if  0 γ > , in which case 
labor supply, capital, output, and consumption, all decline, with the opposite response occurring if 
0 γ < .  Thus, in contrast to the decentralized economy, the steady-state values of  , , ,
oooo kLyc     in the 
centrally planned economy decrease (increase) if the reference stock is formed contemporaneously 
and there is a negative (positive) consumption externality.  One further point is that the long-run 
responses in the centrally planned economy to an increase in productivity remain given by (15). 
This significance of consumption externalities depends crucially upon the flexibility of labor 
supply.  If labor supply is fixed, the optimality conditions for the labor/leisure decision [(14e) and 
(18e)] drop out, while the remaining equations are unchanged, with 
*,
o ll set at their inelastically 
fixed levels.  In that case, as in the decentralized economy, the consumption externality will 
influence the equilibrium if and only if there is a production externality. 
Our objective is to determine how closely the decentralized economy tracks the optimal time 
                                                 
11 More precisely, the constraint is  (1 )0 gn ρ +− > .  The rate of adjustment of the reference consumption stock plus the 
economy’s per capita rate of growth must be positive.   15
path, and to propose tax policies to correct for the distortions that may arise.  Because of the 
complexity of the model we are forced to conduct the analysis of the dynamics numerically, but to 
aid in our understanding of these numerical simulations it is useful to examine first the steady states. 
5.  Comparison of Steady-State Equilibria 
We begin with the simple, but important, case where labor is supplied inelastically.   
5.1  Inelastic labor supply 
In the decentralized economy the steady-state equilibrium values of 
**** ,,, kchy    are 
determined by (14a) – (14d), while in the centrally planned economy, the corresponding steady-state 
values, , , ,
oooo kchy   , are determined by (18a) – (18d).  If labor is supplied inelastically at a common 
level, l , in the two economies, then in the absence of a production externality,  0 η = , these two sets 
of equations are identical, so that the steady-state equilibria in the two economies exactly coincide.  
Consumption externalities, γ , alone then have no effect on the steady state in either economy.   
Thus the crucial factor is the presence of the production externality in the social return to 















         ( 1 9 a )  
which together with (14a) and (18a) immediately yields 
** oo cy cy >   .  Combining (19a) with the 
production functions (14d) and (18d) implies 
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and if, in addition, we (plausibly) assume that the centrally planned economy is dynamically 
efficient, we further obtain 
* o cc <  .
12  We may summarize these results in 
                                                 
12We define “dynamic efficiency” as usual to mean that the economy’s equilibrium capital-labor ratio is less than the 
golden rule ratio.  In this case the dynamic efficiency condition can be shown to be  (1 ) (1 ) ( 1)0 gn β εγ + −− −>  Given 
the restrictions  1, 1 γ ε <> , this is certainly met unless the production externality assumes some implausibly large 
negative value which we effectively rule out.  The relationship 
* o cc <  can be formally established by expanding the 
decentralized equilibrium around the optimum, as set out in the Appendix to Liu and Turnovsky (2005).   16
Proposition 1:  In a decentralized economy with inelastic labor supply and a positive 
production externality, the steady-state equilibrium capital stock and output are 
below their respective optimal levels, while the equilibrium output-capital ratio is too 
high.  The consumption-output ratio is also too high, although if the economy is 
dynamically efficient, the consumption level is too low.  These comparisons are 
reversed if the production externality is negative.  In the absence of any production 
externality, a consumption externality causes no long-run distortionary effects.  
  This proposition is analogous to Proposition 1 in Liu and Turnovsky (2005), although there is 
one significant difference.  In their economy, which is stationary, consumption externalities never 
cause distortions when labor supply is inelastic.  In the present growing economy, although 
consumption externalities alone cause no distortions, their interaction with production externalities 
does generate distortionary effects.  This can be seen from (14c), (18c), together with (19b).   
5.2 Elastic  labor  supply 
  With endogenous labor supply, the consumption externality will now affect the steady state 
even in the absence of any production externality.  This is because it affects the marginal valuation 
of consumption, which in turn changes the optimal utility value of the marginal product of labor.  
Thus, consumption distortion results in labor distortion and therefore creates production inefficiency. 
  The comparison now involves the complete sets of equations (14) and (18) and leads to the 
following.  Consider first the absence of a production externality ( 0 η = ).  In this case, comparing 
(14c) and (18c), (14b) and (18b), (14a) and (18a) implies the equality of the ratios 
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Noting these equalities in conjunction with (14d) and (18d) then implies 
*** oo o kk yy LL ==    , and 
equating (14e) to (18e) yields further 
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From (20) we see that all steady-state quantities in the decentralized economy deviate from their 
corresponding optimal quantities by the same proportionate amount, ϕ  , which depends critically 
upon the nature of the consumption externality.  If it is negative ( 0 γ > ) these ratios all exceed unity, 
implying that these levels all exceed their respective optima, and vice versa if  0 γ < .  They also 
increase with the fraction of time devoted to leisure in the decentralized economy. 
As  ρ  increases, the magnitudes of these proportionate deviations from their respective 
optimum increase.  Consequently the distortions with time non-separable preferences are smaller in 
magnitude than they are if the consumption externality is contemporaneous, when the right hand side 
of (20) becomes 
* 1 ( (1 )) (1 ) L γ γ +− −  .  Moreover, the difference between the conventional 
formulation of contemporaneous consumption externality and the time non-separable specification 
adopted here increases with γ .  The intuition is simply that the larger ρ  the more rapidly current 
consumption is reflected in the reference consumption stock, the shadow value of which becomes 
more negative as γ  increases.  This accentuates the divergent responses of the central planner from 
the representative agent, who ignores these effects.  
    In the case of a positive production externality, but no consumption externality,( 0, 0) η γ >= , 
the comparisons made above in the case of inelastic labor supply continue to apply.  In addition the 
fact that 
** oo cy cy >    implies 
* o ll >  , or equivalently 
* o LL <  , with the reverse applying if  0 η < .  
In this case, it is clear that the relative weight, ρ , in the construction of the reference stock, is 
irrelevant insofar as the steady-state deviation from the optimum is concerned. 
These results may be summarized by the following proposition relating the actual and 
socially optimal equilibria in response to consumption and production externalities. 
Proposition 2:  In an economy with endogenous labor supply, the steady-state 
equilibrium has the following properties. 
1.  In the absence of any production externality, a negative (positive) 
consumption externality causes the equilibrium capital stock, labor supply, output, 
and consumption all to exceed (fall short of) their respective long-run optima by the 
same proportionate amount.  These deviations from the optimum increase in size as:  
(i)  The weight in the reference consumption stock is more heavily weighted   18
toward current consumption. 
(ii)  Utility is more heavily weighted toward relative consumption. 
2.  In the absence of any consumption externality, a positive (negative) 
production externality causes the equilibrium capital stock, labor supply, output, and 
consumption all to fall short of (exceed) their respective long-run optima.  In this 
case, the construction of the reference consumption stock is irrelevant.  
 6.  Optimal Tax Policy  
The fact that consumption and production externalities create distortions in resource 
allocation provides an opportunity for government tax policy to improve efficiency.  Consider again 
the decentralized economy.  Let  , , and  kw c τ ττ  denote the tax rates on capital income, labor income, 
and consumption, respectively, and let  i T  be lump-sum transfers (taxes).  The representative agent 
maximizes the utility function, (1), subject to the budget constraint, now modified to: 
[ ] (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ik i w i c i i Kr n K w L C T τδ τ τ =− − − + − − + +        (21) 
The government maintains a balanced budget, rebating all tax revenues as lump sum transfers: 
      ki wi c i i rK wL C T τ ττ ++ =       ( 2 2 )  
The objective is to characterize a tax structure such that the decentralized economy mimics 
the dynamic equilibrium path of the centrally planned economy, (17a) – (17f).  Two relationships are 
subject to distortions; the consumption-output ratio, (13d), and the evolution of leisure, (13c).  In 
principle, the optimal time path can be replicated by the use of two, possibly time-varying, tax rates, 
which in fact can be chosen in different ways.  Omitting details it is straightforward to establish 
Proposition 3:  The decentralized economy will replicate the optimal time path of the 
centrally planned economy if taxes at each instant of time are set in accordance with 
ˆ (1 ) k τ ησ =− − ,  ww τ τ = ,  and ( ) ˆ (1 ) (1 ) 1 ( )
o
cw qt ττ ρ +− = − ,  where  w τ  is an 
arbitrarily fixed constant and  ()
o q t  evolves in accordance with (17d).  In the limiting 
case  ρ →∞, when the reference stock is contemporaneous,   19
() ˆ (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) cw τ τγ +− = − , and the consumption tax is also constant over time. 
The optimal tax on capital income corrects for the distortion resulting from the production 
externality.  The government should subsidize (tax) capital income according to whether this 
externality is positive (negative).
13  Given the Cobb-Douglas technology, this tax is constant over 
time, although it would become time-varying for more general production functions; see Liu and 
Turnovsky (2005). The consumption tax corrects for the distortion caused by the consumption 
externality.  This depends upon 
o q  and is therefore time-varying, as 
o q  evolves in accordance with 
(17d), and through which it depends upon the production externality, η .  Once the two distortions 
are rectified, no labor income tax is needed and the arbitrarily fixed constant labor income tax can 
thus be set to zero.  If  0 w τ = , private consumption should be subsidized if there is a positive 
consumption externality and should be taxed if there is a negative consumption externality.   
Noting (18f), the consumption and labor income tax ratio converges to 
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It is interesting to compare this result with the corresponding steady-state optimal tax result of Liu 
and Turnovsky (2005).  Using a general utility function, with the consumption externality being 
contemporaneous (i.e.ρ →∞), and abstracting from growth they obtain 
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Setting  0 n =  in (26) and using the fact that for the constant elasticity utility function in steady-state 
HC UU γ =− , (26) can then be expressed in the analogous form 
















     (27’) 
The difference arises because in the present model the benchmark consumption level, being an 
exponentially declining average of all past consumptions, is a stock, whereas in the Liu-Turnovsky 
                                                 
13 This result is a familiar one associated with the Romer (1986) technology.   20
model it is a current flow.  We therefore must take account of both how rapidly the reference stock 
adjusts and the rate of time preference.  Letting ρ →∞, (27’) converges to (27).
14     
7.   Numerical analysis of some transitional paths. 
To study the transitional dynamics we calibrate the model to reproduce some key features of 
actual economies.





Production parameters  1, 0.65,  0.2,  0,0.2, 0.05 α ση δ = == − =  
Preference parameters  0.04,  2.5,  1.75,  0.2,  0.5 β εθ ργ = == ==  
Population growth  0.015 n =  
Most of these are standard and non-controversial.  In this regard,  0.65 σ = , the rate of time 
preference 0.04 β = , the instantaneous intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 10 . 4 ε = , population 
growth rate  0.015 n = , and depreciation rate,  0.05 δ =  are well documented.  The benchmark value 
of the elasticity of leisure in utility, θ = 1.75, implies an equilibrium fraction of time devoted to 
leisure of around 0.7, consistent with the empirical evidence; see e.g. Cooley (1995).
16 
The two key parameters upon which we shall focus are the consumption externality, γ , and 
the production externality, η .  The absence of both externalities,  0 γ η = = , serves as a natural 
benchmark.  For the negative consumption externality, we consider  0.5 γ = , the value taken by 
Carroll et al. (1997) as their benchmark.  For symmetry, we choose  0.5 γ = −  as the magnitude of an 
equivalent positive consumption externality.  For the production externality, we consider the positive 
externality ( 0.2) η =  [increasing returns] and negative externality ( 0.2) η = −  [decreasing returns], 
respectively.  We set the speed of adjustment of the reference stock, at  0.2 ρ = , also the benchmark 
value of Carroll et al.
17  Since we wish to compare the present case where the reference consumption 
                                                 
14 For the constant elasticity utility function (1), the optimal consumption tax, (27), reduces to the constant, 
ˆ 1( 1 ) c τ γ =− . 
15 The dynamics are studied by linearizing the relevant dynamic system, (13) or (17) about its respective steady state, 
(14) and (18).  The details of this are cumbersome, but standard, and are available from the authors on request. 
16 Being a non-scale model, the normalization  1 α =  is unimportant. 
17 Since information on both  , γ ρ  is sparse we have conducted some sensitivity analysis on these parameters.  For 
example, we have run simulations using values  0.8, 0.9 γ = , close to Fuhrer’s (2000) estimates.  We have also chosen   21
stock is formed as a weighted average of past average consumption with the conventional case 
where it is based on the contemporaneous current consumption, we also consider ρ →∞. 
The three panels of Table 2 summarize the key steady-state production and consumption 
variables as η  and γ  vary across their respective specified values.  The benchmark externality-free 
economy ( 0) γ η == is indicated in bold face.  Panel A summarizes the decentralized economy.  
The chosen parameter values imply an output-capital ratio of 0.3, consumption-output ratio of 0.78, 
and fraction of time devoted to labor of around 32% [68% devoted to leisure], all of which are 
plausible.  These values are independent of ρ , as we have shown analytically.  Panel B summarizes 
the first-best optimum, corresponding to our benchmark value  0.2 ρ = , while Panel C provides the 
limiting case where ρ →∞. Overall, the numerical results reported in Table 2 reflect the analytical 
relationships summarized in Propositions 1 and 2.  In particular, we note the following: 
1.  In the absence of both the production and the consumption externality the steady 
states of the decentralized and centrally planned economies coincide; see the bold face entries. 
2.  Consumption externality only  
(i)    The steady-state equilibrium of the decentralized economy is independent of γ .   
(ii)      If the externality is positive (0 . 5 ) γ = − , then  , , , kLyc      in the centrally planned 
economy given in Table B(i) are all proportionately larger [relative to the benchmark,  0 γ = ] by 
24.9%; if is negative (0 . 5 ) γ =  ,,, kLyc     are all proportionately smaller by 32.6%.   
(iii)    As a result,  , , , kLyc     in the decentralized economy are all 20% below their respective 
optima if  0.5 γ =− , while they are all 48.5% above if 0.5 γ = .   
 3.  Production externality only   
  (i)      If the externality is positive (0 . 2 ) η = , then  , , , kLyc      in the centrally planned 
economy increase substantially, although non-uniformly, relative to the benchmark,  0 η = .  These 
range from a 212% increase in k to just a 10.2% increase in L  , implying a 130% increase in  y  , 
                                                                                                                                                                   
larger values of  ρ , as suggested by some of the applications of these models to the equity premium puzzle problem, as 
well as smaller values, which yield more plausible speeds of convergence.  Generally, our main qualitative conclusions 
are robust to the parameter choice, although there are some differences as illustrated in Section 8.3.   22
while  c  increases by 98%.  If the externality is negative,  (0 . 2 ) η = −  ,,, kLyc     decline by 68%, 
9.6%, 32%, and 21%, respectively.  
  (ii)  The response of the decentralized economy to the production externality is much milder.   
  (iii)  As a result of these differential responses,  , , , kLyc     are substantially below their optima, 
by 68.5%, 10.1%, 50.6% and 42.1%, respectively if  0.2 η = .  For  0.2 η = − , , , , kLyc     exceed their 
optima by 194%, 11.3%, 25.9%, 7.9%, respectively.  
4.  Distortions arising from positive production externalities are generally reduced 
(increased) in the presence of negative (positive) consumption externalities.  Distortions with respect 
to negative production externalities are generally increased in the presence of negative consumption 
externalities, but only slightly in the presence of positive consumption externalities. 
  5.  Comparing Panels B(i) and B(ii) confirms the role of ρ  noted in Prop. 2.  Namely: 
  (i) The (uniform) ratio of 
* o kk  , etc. obtained in the absence of a production externality, [see 
(20)] increases from 1.48 to 1.68 for a positive consumption externality and decreases from 0.80 to 
0.77 for a negative externality, as ρ  increases from 0.2 to a contemporaneous externality (ρ →∞). 
  (ii) In the absence of a consumption externality, the distortions induced by the production 
externality are independent of ρ  
  These numerical results suggest that the distortions are relatively insensitive to substantial 
changes in ρ .  However, this depends in part upon the choice of γ .  If, we increase γ  to 0.8, for 
example, we find that increasing ρ  from 0.2 to ρ →∞ has much more dramatic effects on the 
distortion.  Assuming  0, η =  we find that it increases the ratio 
* o kk   from 2.30 to 3.71.
18 
8. Dynamic  Adjustment 
  We now compare the dynamic adjustments of the decentralized economy to the optimal 
                                                 
18 We should point out that some aspects of our comparisons depend upon the elasticity of leisure in utility.  While space 
limitations preclude exploring this aspect in detail, the following differences when labor supply is inelastic arise.  First, 
changes in output and consumption due to both positive and negative production externalities are much less sensitive to 
the consumption externality, than when labor supply is elastic.  Second, output and consumption in the centrally planned 
economy increase with γ  in the presence of a positive production externality, in contrast to when labor supply is fixed.    23
adjustments by considering a 50% increase in productivity, α .  These are summarized in Tables 3 
and 4 and illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.  As a reference point, Table 3.A reports the proportionate 
long-run responses in the capital stock, output, labor, and consumption.  Recalling (15), these 
responses are identical in both the decentralized and centrally planned economies, and increase with 
η  but are independent of both γ  and ρ .  Consequently, the long-run relative distortions due to a 
consumption externality are unaffected by whether the externality is contemporaneous or lagged.  
8.1 Long-run  Welfare 
Panels B(i) and B(ii) report the changes in intertemporal welfare resulting from the 
productivity increase.  These measure the changes in the representative agent’s optimized utility 
function  Ω [given in (1)], in the two economies (decentralized economy and centrally planned).  
The welfare gains reported are equivalent variation measures, calculated as the percentage change in 
the permanent flow of consumption in the respective economies, necessary to equate the levels of 
welfare to what they would be following the increase in productivity.  
In contrast to the measures of economic activity, the changes in welfare do depend upon the 
consumption externality, γ , as well as upon ρ .  This is because with sluggish adjustment, current 
consumption exceeds the reference level during the transition.  Accordingly, if  0 γ > , the “catching 
up with the Joneses” individual derives additional utility, relative to an individual having 
conventional utility, due to the fact that he is doing well relative to the recent experience of his peers, 
as reflected in the current reference stock.  For example, in the benchmark case  0 γ η ==, 0.2 ρ = , 
the individual’s intertemporal welfare increases by 69.7%, whereas if  0.5 γ = , the welfare gain 
increases to 82.4%.  An altruistic individual, however, enjoys only a 64.2% welfare gain.   
Several features in Table 3.B(i) merit comment.  First, the percentage utility gains are similar 
in magnitude for the decentralized and centrally planned economies with identical externalities, 
though generally somewhat larger for the latter.  But since the decentralized economy usually has a 
non-optimal production and consumption structure, its initial welfare level is substantially below that 
of the centrally planned economy, so that the absolute utility gains are significantly smaller.  Second, 
in some cases, utility gains are proportionately larger in the decentralized economy, though its   24
welfare remains well below the optimum.   
Table B(ii) presents the welfare for ρ →∞, enabling us to compare these long-run responses 
to those obtained when the consumption externality is contemporaneous.  In general, we find that the 
utility gains for the time non-separable utility function exceed (are less than) those for conventional 
utility according to whether the consumption externality, is negative, (positive).  This is because if 
0 γ > , for example, the additional utility the agent derives from having his current consumption 
exceed the economy-wide reference level, is enhanced by the slower adjustment of the reference 
level in the time non-separable case.  
8.2   Short-Run Effects 
  Table 4 reports the short-run responses to the productivity increase.  We shall focus on the 
cases of a negative consumption externality ( 0.5) γ =  and a positive production externality ( 0.2) η =  
for the case  0.2 ρ =  summarized in Col. 3, Row 3 of Panel (i).   
Consider first the benchmark case where there are no externalities,  0 γ η ==.  In this case, 
the decentralized economy exactly mimics the centrally planned economy throughout the entire 
transitional path.  A productivity increase of 50% immediately raises employment in both economies 
by 0.95 percentage points, raising output by 52.9% and consumption by 46.4%.   
Negative consumption externality: Now suppose that there is a negative consumption 
externality ( 0.5 γ = ) but no production externality ( 0 η = ).  In this case, the decentralized economy 
begins from an initial steady state in which consumption, capital, output, and employment are all 
48.3% above their optimal values; see Table 2A, 2B.  A 50% increase in α  raises output directly in 
both economies, and will raise consumption, though by a lesser amount, due an increase in the 
savings ratio.  As a result, the consumption-output ratio falls initially in both economies.  Since the 
representative agent in the decentralized economy ignores the negative consumption externality, he 
overvalues consumption, relative to its optimum, so that consumption increases more in the 
decentralized economy, causing the consumption-output ratio to decline by less in that economy.  At 
the same time, by directly influencing final output, the productivity shock increases the ultimate 
scarcity of habit relative to capital, thereby making q more negative, so that the social value of the   25
consumption-output ratio, () ( 1 ) cy q ρ −  actually declines less.  As a result, leisure in the centrally 
planned economy declines less [c.f. (13d) and (17e)] so that labor supply increases more in the 
decentralized economy, raising output by more in that economy, as well.  Following their initial 
jumps, output, and consumption in both the decentralized and centrally planned economies increase 
monotonically toward their new steady states levels, while the capital stocks increase gradually from 
their respective initial levels.  Since in the long-run labor allocations do not change, labor supply 
declines monotonically in both economies, back toward their respective original steady-state values.   
Since we wish to focus on the distortions, Fig. 1.A plots the time paths of the ratios 
** ** , , , 
oo oo yy cc kk L L .  Fig 1.A(i) illustrates the case  0.5, 0 γ η = = .  All four ratios begin at 
the common value 1.483 and eventually converge back to that ratio after the shock.  On impact, 
* o cc  rises to around 1.51, 
* o LL  to 1.495, 
* o yy  to 1.490, while the capital stock remains fixed 
instantaneously.  The amount of over-consumption, over-production, and over-employment in the 
decentralized economy (relative to the optimum) all increase.  The over-consumption in the 
decentralized economy means that capital begins to accumulate at a slower rate in the decentralized 
economy, so that 
* o kk  initially declines, although eventually it converges back to its equilibrium 
ratio.  The interesting feature of these paths is that throughout the transition all four variables exceed 
their respective long-run optima, with some deviations in the degree during the early stages.  These 
divergences in the paths reflect the fact that agents in the decentralized economy, by ignoring the 
impact of current consumption on the reference level generate a faster speed of convergence. 
Positive production externality: Now suppose that there is a positive production externality 
(0 . 2 η = ) but no consumption externality ( 0 γ = ).  In this case the decentralized economy is one in 
which capital, labor, output, and consumption are all less than their respective optima, but to vastly 
different degrees (
** * * 31%, 90% , 49%,  58%
oo o o kk LL yy cc == = =    ).  Since the productivity 
shock affects all variables proportionately, and since the positive production externality has little 
effect on the relative speeds of convergence of the two economies, Fig. 1.A (ii) illustrates how the 
deviations from the optimum remain almost constant along the transitional paths.   
Positive production externality and negative consumption externality:  We now combine 
cases (i) and (ii) by assuming  0.2,  0.5 η γ == .  This combines elements of the two previous cases.    26
Whereas the capital stock, output, and consumption are all initially less than their respective optima 
(
** * 53%, 83%,  99%
oo o kk yy cc == =   ), labor exceeds its optimum (
* 129%
o LL=  ).  On the 
one hand the negative consumption externality leads to over-employment, over-production, and 
over-consumption, on the other, the production externality has the opposite effect.  As in Fig. 
1.A(ii), there is almost no change in the deviation of the decentralized economy relative to its 
optimum over time.  The most interesting feature about Fig. 1.A(iii) is that the effect of the negative 
consumption externality is to generate initial over-consumption by about 2%, which gradually 
declines over time and after about 20 years returns to under-consumption.  
Table 4 (ii) provides the analogous effects in the case of the contemporaneous consumption 
externality, with Fig. 1.B illustrating the dynamic adjustments.  The same generally qualitative 
responses can be seen, although there are some differences.  Consumption initially jumps higher to 
1.75 and quickly drops.  The dynamic adjustments have generally the same qualitative properties as 
when 0.2 ρ = , except that the convergence occurs more rapidly. 
8.3   Two Alternative Parameter Choices 
  The dynamic adjustments illustrated in Fig. 1.A exhibit two characteristics.  First, while 
modest externalities can generate substantial long-run deviations of the decentralized economy from 
the optimum, these show relatively little variation over time.  For the pure consumption externality 
the maximum distortions, which occur during the initial phase, are within 1.5% of the long-run 
distortions, and their time paths are even more uniform in the presence of a production externality.  
Second, while the magnitudes of the distortions are substantially larger when the externality is 
contemporaneous, the patterns over time are qualitatively similar to those obtained when  0.2 ρ = . 
  In Figure 2 we illustrate two modifications to our parameter choice, which have the effect of 
accentuating the differences between the contemporaneous externality and the slowly adjusting 
externality.  In the first case we increase γ  to 0.9, so that utility is more influenced by relative rather 
than absolute consumption.  This not only increases the (common) ratio of 
* o kk   etc. in the absence 
of a production externality from around 3 to over 7 as ρ  increases from 0.2 to ∞, but it also 
reverses the patterns in the distortions, 
* () ()
o kt kt  during the early phase of the transition.  With a   27
contemporaneous reference stock, 
* () ()
o kt kt  continues to initially fall and then rise, as in Fig. 1, 
but with a slowly evolving reference stock, this adjustment is now reversed.   
  One characteristic of our chosen parameterization is that it implies an asymptotic speed of 
convergence of around 10%.  While this is consistent with some estimates [e.g. Caselli et al. (1996)] 
it exceeds the consensus values, which now range up to about 6%.
19  Calibration of this aspect of the 
model is improved by setting the consumption externality γ  to 0.9 and slowing the adjustment of the 
reference stock to  0.1 ρ = .  In addition, assuming an inelastic labor supply enables us to bring out an 
interesting contrast from the result obtained by Liu and Turnovsky (2005) based on the conventional 
time separable utility function where the externality occurs contemporaneously.  For the constant 
elasticity specification being assumed here, and inelastic labor supply, they find that the 
consumption externality causes no distortionary effects along the transitional path.   
Fig. 2.II.A plots the deviations of the decentralized economy from the optimum, for the 
parameter set  0, 0.9, 0.1, 0 η γρ θ == = = .  The capital stock shows a highly non-monotonic 
adjustment path, which is mirrored in the other variables.  During the first few years there is over-
accumulation of capital by about 0.5%; during the next 85 years there is under-accumulation of 
capital, which reaches 5% below its optimum after around 40 years; and finally after about 95 years 
there is over-accumulation of capital.  It is hard to provide a simple intuitive explanation for this 
pattern, except to note that it is a consequence of slower convergence, due to in part to less flexibility 
in labor supply, together with a slower adjusting reference stock.  The cyclical element reflects the 
technical fact that the stable eigenvalues have quite substantial complex components.  Increasing 
ρ →∞, Fig. 2.II.B shows that the dynamic paths of all the ratios simply converge to unity over 
time, implying the absence of distortionary effects, consistent with Liu and Turnovsky (2005). 
9. Conclusions 
The theoretical and empirical importance of both consumption and production externalities 
are well documented.  In addition, a growing body of empirical evidence supports the importance of 
time non-separable preferences as an alternative to the conventional time separable utility function.  
                                                 
19Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) provide a detailed analysis of convergence speeds for time non-separable utility.    28
With this motivation, this paper has examined the effects of both types of externalities on economic 
performance assuming this more general specification of preferences and discussed the appropriate 
corrective taxes.  In the light of previous research emphasizing the importance of the interaction 
between preferences and technology, our analysis has employed the more flexible non-scale 
production technology.  The approach we have taken is to combine the theoretical analysis with 
numerical simulations based on the calibration of a plausible macroeconomic growth model. 
We have drawn three main sets of theoretical conclusions.  First, a consumption externality 
in isolation has long-run distortionary effects if and only if labor is supplied elastically.  But even 
with fixed labor supply, consumption externalities will still have transitional distortionary effects, 
and they will generate long-run distortions through their interaction with production externalities.  
With elastic labor supply, a negative consumption externality leads to sub-optimally large long-run 
capital, labor supply, output, and consumption.  Second, production externalities always generate 
long-run distortions, irrespective of whether or not labor supply is fixed.  Thus a positive production 
externality leads to a sub-optimally low capital stock with under-production and under-consumption.  
Third, we have provided a simple characterization of optimal tax policy that enables the replication 
of the entire optimal path.  It requires that capital income be taxed or subsidized at a constant rate 
that corrects for the production externality, while consumption should be taxed or subsidized at a 
time-varying rate that corrects for the divergence between the social and private benefits from the 
consumption externality as the economy evolves along its transitional path.   
The simulations supplement these theoretical findings with important quantitative insights.  
One striking finding is the sharp contrast between the effects of consumption and production 
externalities on the deviations of the decentralized economy from the optimum along the transitional 
paths.  Finally, throughout we have compared our results with those obtained under conventional 
time-separable preferences when the consumption externality is contemporaneous.  While some of 
the long-run theoretical effects are fairly robust in this respect across steady states, there are also 
important qualitative and quantitative differences, particularly along transitional paths.   Table 2: Impact of Externalities on Steady State Equilibrium  
 
A. Decentralized Equilibrium (independent of ρ ) 
 
  0.5 γ =−   0 γ =   0.5 γ =  
η  * k   
* L   
* y   
* c   
* k   
* L   
* y   
* c   
* k   
* L   
* y   
* c   
-0.2  2.00  0.325 0.535 0.412  1.93  0.324 0.530 0.412  1.86  0.322 0.525 0.411 
0  2.05  0.322 0.615 0.482  2.05  0.322 0.615 0.482  2.05  0.322 0.615 0.482 
0.2  1.82  0.317 0.658 0.527  2.01  0.319 0.698 0.554  2.23  0.321 0.743 0.583 
 
 
B. Centrally Planned Economy 
(i) Slowly Adjusting Reference Stock(0 . 2 ) ρ =  
 
 
  0.5 γ =−   0 γ =   0.5 γ =  
η  o k   
o L   
o y   
o c   
o k   
o L   
o y   
o c   
o k   
o L   
o y   
o c   
-0.2  0.816 0.371 0.509 0.459 0.657 0.291 0.421 0.381 0.462 0.192 0.305 0.276 
0  2.56  0.402 0.768 0.602  2.05  0.322 0.615 0.482  1.38  0.217 0.414 0.325 
0.2  7.70  0.430 1.774 1.222  6.39  0.355 1.414 0.956  4.20  0.248 0.890 0.590 
 
 
B. Centrally Planned Economy 
(ii) Contemporaneous Reference Stock () ρ →∞  
 
  0.5 γ =−   0 γ =   0.5 γ =  
η  o k   
o L   
o y   
o c   
o k   
o L   
o y   
o c   
o k   
o L   
o y   
o c   
-0.2  0.834 0.381 0.520 0.469 0.657 0.291 0.421 0.381 0.421 0.170 0.278 0.252 
0  2.65  0.415 0.794 0.622  2.05  0.322 0.615 0.482  1.22  0.192 0.366 0.287 
0.2  8.15 0.446 1.88  1.29  6.39 0.355 1.41 0.956 3.50 0.219  0.742  0.491 
 
 Table 3: Effect of 50% Increase in Productivityα :  
 
A.  (Common) Long-run Effects (independent of  , γ ρ ) 
 
  yy kk cc ∆= ∆= ∆     
0.20 η = −  61.1 
0 η =  86.6 
0.20 η =  146.2 
 
 
B.  Percentage Change in Intertemporal Welfare  
 
(i)  Slowly Adjusting Reference Stock () 0.2 ρ =  
 
 Decentralized  Economy  Optimum 
η  0.5 γ =−  0 γ =  0.5 γ =  0.5 γ = −  0 γ =  0.5 γ =  
-0.2  53.0 54.7 60.9 53.9 57.1 68.2 
0 64.2  69.7  82.4 64.2 69.7  85.7 




(ii)  Contemporaneous Reference Stock () ρ →∞  
 
 Decentralized  Economy  Optimum 
η  0.5 γ =−   0 γ =   0.5 γ =   0.5 γ = −   0 γ =   0.5 γ =  
-0.2  55.8 54.7 51.7 56.9 57.1 56.9 
0 70.1  69.7  66.9 69.5 69.7  69.5 




 Table 4. Short-run Effects 
 (i)   Slowly Adjusting Reference Stock () 0.2 ρ =  
 
   0.5 γ = −   0 γ =   0.5 γ =  
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(ii).   Contemporaneous Reference Stock () ρ →∞  
 
   0.5 γ = −  0 γ =  0.5 γ =  
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 Figure 1: Increase in Productivity α  
A.  Slowly Adjusting Reference Stock ( 0.2 ρ = )   B. Contemporaneous Reference Stock (ρ →∞) 
(i) (0 ,0 . 5 ) η γ = =  
(ii) (0 . 2 ,0 ) η γ = =  
(iii) (0 . 2 ,0 . 5 ) η γ = =  
Capital  Labor   Output Consumption
















































ratio dec êoptFigure 2: Increase in Productivity α : Two Alternative Comparisons 
A.  Slowly Adjusting Reference Stock ( 0.2 ρ = )   B. Contemporaneous Reference Stock (ρ →∞) 
(iii) (0 . 0 ,0 . 9 ,0 ) η γθ = ==  
Capital  Labor   Output Consumption
( 0, 0.9) η γ = =
















I. Larger Weight to Reference Stock
II. Inelastic Labor supply
A.  Slowly Adjusting Reference Stock ( 0.1 ρ = )   B. Contemporaneous Reference Stock (ρ →∞) 


















ratio dec êopt  29
References 
Abel, A., 1990.  Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the Joneses. American 
Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 80, 38-42. 
Alonso-Carrera J., Caballé, J., Raurich, X., 2005.  Growth, habit formation and catching-up with the 
Joneses. European Economic Review 49, 1665-1691. 
Alvarez-Cuadrado, F., Monteiro, G., Turnovsky, S.J., 2004.  Habit formation, catching up with the 
Joneses, and non-scale growth. Journal of Economic Growth 9, 47-80.  
Barro, R.J., Sala-i-Martin, X., 1992.  Public finance in models of economic growth. Review of 
Economic Studies 59, 645-661. 
Benarroch, M., 1997.  Returns to scale in Canadian manufacturing: An interprovincial comparison. 
Canadian Journal of Economics 30, 1083-1103. 
Caballero, R.J., Lyons, R.K., 1990.  Internal versus external economies in European industry. 
European Economic Review 34, 805-830. 
Caballero, R.J., Lyons, R.K., 1992.  External effects in U.S. procyclical productivity. Journal of 
Monetary Economics 29, 209-225. 
Campbell, J.Y., Cochrane, J.N., 1999.  By force of habit: A consumption-based explanation of 
aggregate stock behavior. Journal of Political Economy 107, 205-251. 
Carroll, C., Overland, J., Weil, D., 1997.  Comparison utility in a growth model. Journal of 
Economic Growth 2, 339-367. 
Caselli, F., Esquivel, G., Lefort, F., 1996.  Reopening the convergence debate: A new look at cross-
country empirics. Journal of Economic Growth 1, 363-390. 
Clark, A.E., Oswald, A.J., 1996.  Satisfaction and comparison income. Journal of Public Economics 
61, 359-381. 
Constantinides, G.M., 1990.  Habit formation: A resolution of the equity premium puzzle. Journal of 
Political Economy 98, 519–543. 
Cooley, T.F. (ed.), 1995.  Frontiers of Business Cycle Research. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ.   30
Dupor, B., Liu, W.F., 2003.  Jealousy and equilibrium overconsumption. American Economic 
Review 93, 423-428. 
Easterlin, R.A., 1995.  Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all? Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 27, 35-47. 
Eicher, T.S., Turnovsky, S.J., 1999.  Non-scale models of economic growth. Economic Journal 109, 
394-415. 
Fisher, W.H., Hof, F.X., 2000.  Relative consumption, economic growth, and taxation. Journal of 
Economics (Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie) 72, 241-262. 
Frank, R., 1997.  Happiness and economic performance. Economic Journal 107, 1815-1831. 
Fuhrer, J.C., 2000.  Habit formation in consumption and its implications for monetary-policy 
models. American Economic Review 90, 367–390. 
Gali, J., 1994.  Keeping up with the Joneses: Consumption externalities, portfolio choice, and asset 
prices. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 26, 1–8. 
Jones, C.I., 1995.  Time series tests of endogenous growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 
495-527. 
Liu, W.F., Turnovsky, S.J., 2005.  Consumption externalities, production externalities, and long-run 
macroeconomic efficiency. Journal of Public Economics 89, 1097-1029. 
Ljungqvist, L. Uhlig, H., 2000.  Tax policy and aggregate demand management under catching up 
with the Joneses. American Economic Review 90, 356-366. 
Osborn, D.R., 1988.  Seasonality and habit persistence in a life cycle model of consumption. Journal 
of Applied Econometrics 3, 255-266. 
Romer, P. M., 1986.  Increasing returns and long run growth. Journal of Political Economy 94, 
1002-1037.  
Ryder, H.E., Heal, G.M., 1973.  Optimal growth with intertemporally dependent preferences. Review 
of Economic Studies 40, 1–31. 
Stadt, H. van de, Kapteyn, A., Geer, S. van de, 1985.  The relativity of utility: Evidence from panel 
data. Review of Economics and Statistics 67, 179–187. 
Turnovsky, S.J., 2000.  Macroeconomic Dynamics 2
nd ed. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.  